Torts -- Insulating Negligence in North Carolina by Preston, James Y.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 38 | Number 1 Article 15
12-1-1959
Torts -- Insulating Negligence in North Carolina
James Y. Preston
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
James Y. Preston, Torts -- Insulating Negligence in North Carolina, 38 N.C. L. Rev. 104 (1959).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol38/iss1/15
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use of the insured's name would result in a more sympathetic treatment
by the jury than if the insurance company itself brought the action."0
Where the insurance covers the entire loss, the question of who is the
real party in interest may depend upon whether there as been in fact a
loan or a full payment.3 0  However, this loan device is of very doubtful
utility in the case of a claim arising under an automobile collision policy
containing a deductible clause. Regardless of whether the insurer has
paid or loaned the amount of the damage, less the deductible figure,
the court will require the use of the insured's name as the real party in
interest 3 ' unless one of the procedures outlined above is employed to
vest this title in the insurer.
ALLAN W. MARKHAM
Torts-Insulating Negligence in North Carolina
The doctrine of insulating negligence and the task of predicting how
the court will hold in an intervening negligence situation continue to be
problems in North Carolina. The issue of insulation arises when one
party through a negligent act or omission has created an unreasonable
risk of harm to others and a second actor through a subsequent act or
omission brings the risk to reality to the injury of the plaintiff. The
problem is whether the two tort-feasors may be held jointly liable or
whether the first tort-feasor is insulated by the later negligence of the
second tort-feasor. Our court has said that the problem of insulating
negligence is one of proximate cause' and that the test is whether the
-" Quaere, whether this assumption is valid today where often there is an in-
surer behind the plaintiff in automobile damage suits, and most jurors are aware
of this fact.
"In Cumingham & Hinshaw v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 139 N.C. 427, 51 S.E.
1029 (1905), it was determined by the jury that the "loan" was in fact a full and
final payment of the plaintiff-insured's claim by the insurer, thereby divesting the
insured of any standing to sue on the claim. Contra, Sosnow, Kranz & Simcoe,
Inc. v. Storatti Corp., 269 App. Div. 122, 54 N.Y.S.2d 780 (1945), where a suit
in the insured's name under a similar loan agreement was permitted, as it did not
prejudice the defendant, i.e., it would not allow the plaintiff a double recovery nor
make the defendant liable to multiple suits for the same wrong. Accord, McCann
v. Dixie Lake & Realty Co., 44 Ga. App. 700, 162 S.E. 869 (1932).
31 The court will not, however, raise the issue ex viero motza if the defendant
does not object. Southern Stock Fire Ins. Co. v. Southern Ry., 179 N.C. 290, 102
S.E. 504 (1920).
1 Montgomery v. Blades, 222 N.C. 463, 23 S.E.2d 844 (1943) ; Luttrell v. Caro-
lina Mineral Co., 220 N.C. 782, 18 S.E.2d 412 (1942) ; Butner v. Spease, 217 N.C.
82, 6 S.E.2d 808 (1940). The generally accepted definition of proximate cause in
North Carolina is that announced in Adams v. State Bd. of Educ., 248 N.C. 506,
511, 103 S.E.2d 854, 857 (1958): "Proximate cause is a cause which in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new and independent cause, produced the
plaintiff's injuries, and without which the injuries would not have occurred, and
from which a person of ordinary prudence could have reasonably foreseen that
such a result, or some similar injurious result, was probable under the facts as they
existed." McIntyre v. Monarch Elevator & Mach. Co., 230 N.C. 539, 54 S.E.2d
45 (1949) ; .Cant v. Gant, 197 N.C. 164, 148 S.E. 34 (1929) ; Van Dyke v. Chad-
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first tort-feasor could reasonably foresee the intervening act.2 The
following discussion is broken down into types of fact situations in
which the court has tended to be inconsistent and an indication of several
areas in which it has tended to be consistent in cases decided since 1 9 5 4 .8
Intersection Collisions
In cases involving intersection collisions where the first tort-feasor
is driving on the dominant highway and the second tort-feasor enters
from a servient highway the court has applied differing tests. In Loving
v. Whitton4 plaintiff was a passenger in A's'car, which on entering from
the servient highway collided with B's car. Plaintiff alleged that A and
B were concurrently negligent in that A failed to stop at a stop sign
and B was speeding, failed to maintain a proper lookout, and failed to
keep his car under control. ' The court sustained B's demurrer, saying
that reasonable unforeseeability"of the intervenihg act is the test for
insulation and that in the abseiice of allegations"6f fact that B observed
or should have observed tihat A did not intentf to stop, B was en-
titled to assume'that 'A wv6uld observe the law 5  The court also said
that irrespective of his own negligence B could not have avbided the
collision which the 'cohduct- of A nmade inevitable.6
In Blalock v. Hart,7 a- dase arisifig on fa6ts' similar to those in the
Loving case, the court- held that there was sufficient evidence to go to'tlae
wick-Hoskins Co., 187 N.C 695, 122 S.E. 657 '(1924); Ramsbottom v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 138 N.C. 39,' 50 S.E. 448 (1905). As defined above, proximate
cause includes actual cause and foreseeability. Traditionally and by good authority
it must be determined that defendant's neglignce actually caused plaintiff's injury
before the question of foreseeability is reached. PROSSER; TORTS § 44 (2d ed.
1955). Actual cause is determined by either the "but for" test or the substantial
factor test. Henderson v. Powell, 221 N.C. 239, 19 S.E.2d 876. (1942) ; PROSSER,
op. cit. supra, § 44; RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 430-32 (1934).'
'In Garner v. Pittman, 237 N.C. 328, 75 S.E.2d" Ill (1953, the court said that
foreseeability of the intervening act is the' test for whethe- the intervening act is
such a new, independent and efficient cause as tb'insulate the' original -wrongful
act. -If the intervening act could not have been reasonably foreseen, the original
wrongdoer is insulated. Accord, Moore v. Plymouth, 249 N.C. 423, 106 S.E.2d
695 (1959); Banks v. Shepard, 230 N.C. 86, 52, S.E.2d 215 (1949); Warner v.
Lazarus, 229 N.C. 27, 47 S.E.2d 496 (1948) ; Reeves v. Staley, 220 N.C. 573, 18
S.E.2d 239 (1942); Beach v. Patton, 208 N.C. 134, 179 S.E. 446 (1935); Line-
berry v. North Carolina Ry., 187 N.C. 786, 123. S.E. 1 (1924)'; Harton v. Forest
City Tel. Co., 141 N.C. 455, 54 S.E. 299 (1906).
'The scope of ibis Note is limited to discussion of cases decided since publica-
tion of the Note on the, same subject'in 33 N.C.L. REv.'498 (1955).
'241 N.C. 273, 84 S.E.2d 919 (1954).
'Accord, Reeves v. Staley, 220 N.C. 573, '18 S.E.2d 239 (1942).
' In the latter statement it appea~s that the court is saying that the negligence
of B was not an actual cause of the collision. To recover plaintiff must prove:(1) that defendant was negligent; (2) that defendant's negligence actually caused
plaintiff's injury; and (3) that plaintiff's injury was reasonably foreseeable.. See
note 1 supra. If the court decided that defendant's negligence was not an actual
cause of the collision, it would seem that the issue of insulation should not have
been reached.
7239 N.C. 475, 80 S.E.2d 373 (1954).
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jury as against both defendants. 8 The court said that, though there
was no duty on the part of B to foresee negligence, he had a duty of
due care which included maintaining a reasonable speed, keeping a
proper lookout, and taking such action as an ordinarily prudent person
would take to avoid the collision when he noticed or should have noticed
that A was not stopping. These cases are difficult to distinguish. The
court emphasizes the dominant driver's "duty of due care" in Blalock.
Such an emphasis does not afford a logical distinction between the cases,
for the question of insulation does not arise until it is established that
both defendants have breached their duty of due care. It may be that
the court found that B should have observed that A was not stopping.
If this is true, the holding is sound, but such a finding would not seem
warranted by the court's statement of facts.9
In Primm v. King,'0 arising on facts similar to those in Loving and
Blalock," the court refused to insulate the negligence of B, the dominant
driver, because there was a factual showing that B was on actual notice
that A was not going to stop. Thus, while Loving and Prinmt are
clearly consistent,12 Blalock conflicts with this line of cases.18
Rear-end Collisions
Another area in which confusion has been created by recent decisions
is that of rear-end collisions. One type situation is that represented by
Potter v. Frosty Morn Meats, Inc.,14 where plaintiff was injured when
the car in which she was a passenger collided with the rear of a truck
owned by Frosty Morn which was stopped in the road. 5 Plaintiff sued
defendant Potter, the driver of her car, and the trucker. After the trial
court sustained the demurrer of Frosty Morn, defendant Potter filed a
'The evidence indicated that it was after dark (a variation from the facts in
Loving which would seem to justify no difference in legal result), and that at the
intersection involved there was something of a blind corner, but that the lights
of a car approaching the intersection could be seen by the driver of a car on the
intersecting highway. However, there was nothing to indicate to B that A was
going to "run" the stop sign.
' It is arguable that it is the Loving decision that is erroneous, while Blalock
reaches the correct result. In this intersection situation, both parties are negli-
gent, and their negligence concurs to produce the result, the negligence of eachbeing an actual cause of the injury. For discussion on whether there is ever a
duty to foresee negligence, see note 32 infra.o 249 N.C. 228, 106 S.E.2d 223 (1958).
"The main factual distinction other than that appearing in the text was that
plaintiff was a passenger in the dominant driver's car.
1 See discussion of these two cases in 37 N.C.L. REv. 456 (1959).
1 It should be further noted that the court in Prinwm cited Blalock v. Hart,
thus relying on a case which departs from the general rule in these cases estab-
lished in Loving v. Whifon.14242 N.C. 67, 86 S.E.2d 780 (1955).15The fact situation presented by this case is ambiguous. The court took the
view that the truck was parked on the road. However, the cross-complaint and
the appellate briefs indicate the possibility that the truck was proceeding down thehighway with Potter following, and that the truck driver stopped suddenly, caus-
ing Potter to crash into the rear of the truck. In this event the case should be
controlled by Banks v. Shepard, 230 N.C. 86, 52 S.E.2d 215 (1949).
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cross-action against Frosty Morn for contribution. 1 6 The court, in sus-
taining Frosty Morn's demurrer to the cross-complaint, said that it was
the active negligence of defendant Potter in failing to observe the truck
which proximately caused the collision. The court relied on the lan-
guage in Butner v. Spease17 that "if the original wrong only becomes
injurious in consequence of the intervention of some distinct wrongful
act or omission on the part of another or others, the injury is to be
imputed to the last wrong as proximate cause ... ."18 But it is sub-
mitted that parking a truck in the highway is indicative of negligence. 9
And if the trucker was negligent, the intervening act and resulting
injury would seem to be foreseeable consequences of the risk created.20
A similar situation is presented in Howze v. McCall.21 As plaintiff
was proceeding along the highway, a car belonging to defendant Lyons
appeared parked in plaintiff's lane. As plaintiff applied his brakes, he
was struck from behind by a car driven by defendant McCall. In plain-
tiff's suit against both alleged tort-feasors, 22 the court sustained Lyons'
demurrer, saying that, even conceding negligence on the part of de-
fendant Lyons, there would have been no collision but for the inter-
vening acts of defendant McCall. When viewed in the light of previous
decisions in cases of a similar nature, the decision in Howze is clearly
consistent with the previous holdings.2 3 Despite the consistency, how-
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-240 (1953).17217 N.C. 82, 6 S.E.2d 808 (1940) (a head-on collision case).18 Butner v. Spease, 217 N.C. 82, 88, 6 S.E.2d 808, 811 (1940). See also Caulder
v. Gresham, 224 N.C. 402, 30 S.E.2d 312 (1944), where, on facts similar to the
Potter case, the court stated that the rule is divided into two parts: (1) where the
second actor has become aware of the existence of a potential danger created by
the negligence of the first wrongdoer, and thereafter, by an independent act of
negligence, brings about the accident, the first wrongdoer is relieved of liability;
but (2) where the second actor does not become apprised of the danger until his
own negligence, added to that of the existing perilous condition, has made the
accident inevitable, the negligent acts of the two tort-feasors are contributing
causes and impose liability on both. It appears that the court has applied differing
tests in differing fact situations to give rise to two lines of decisions. Likewise,
in applying Butner v. Spease, the court has failed to recognize that the test for
insulation as there enunciated included reasonable unforeseeability of the inter-
vening act.
19 N.C. GmN. STAT. § 20-161 (1953) reads as follows: "(a) No person shall
park or leave standing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon the paved
or improved or main traveled portion of the highway, outside of a business or
residence district, when it is practicable to park or leave such vehicle standing off
the paved or improved or main traveled portion of such highway . .. ."
'o See, e.g., Caulder v. Gresham, 224 N.C. 402, 30 S.E.2d 312 (1944), discussed
in note 18 supra; White v. Carolina Realty Co., 182 N.C. 536, 109 S.E.2d 564(1921), which applies the foreseeability test and holds the first tort-feasor. Contra,
Godwin v. Nixon, 236 N.C. 632, 74 S.E.2d 24 (1953), which though applying the
foreseeability test held the result unforeseeable.
21249 N.C. 250, 106 S.E.2d 236 (1958).
2Plaintiff alleged that Lyons was negligent in parking on the highway and
in failing to warn and that McCall was negligent in following too closely, speeding,
and failing to keep a proper lookout.
" Smith v. Grubb, 238 N.C. 665, 78 S.E.2d 598 (1953) ; Hollifield v. Everhart,
237 N.C. 313, 74 S.E.2d 706 (1953).
1959]
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ever, the use of the "but for" 24 test in Howze seems questionable.2  The
question should have been whether the intervening act and plaintiff's
injury were reasonably foreseeable. 26
In contrast to the above situation, in rear-end collision cases where
the acts of the two tort-feasors have been more nearly concurrent in
point of time, the court has been consistent in refusing to insulate. Thus,
in Riddle v. Artis2 7 plaintiff alleged that defendant Artis skidded across
the centerline and collided with his automobile and that defendant
Morris negligently ran into the rear of plaintiff's automobile. The de-
murrer of defendant Morris, the original wrongdoer, was overruled, the
court saying that in order for the doctrine of insulating negligence to
apply, the intervening act must be a new and independent force which
turns aside the natural course of events set in motion by the original
wrongdoer "and produces a result which would not otherwise have
followed and which could not have been reasonably anticipated." 28 This
decision also seems to be in line with the court's holdings in previous
cases of the same or similar character. 29  The use of the foreseeability
test is undoubtedly correct. It is to be: noted that here the original
wrongdoer is not being required to foresee negligence, but he is bound to
foresee that, if for- any .reason the plaintiff is forced to slow down, it is
likely that he will not be able to stop in time to avoid hitting plaintiff's
car. It is difficult to see why the court reached a different result in
Howze from that reached here., Cleaiy, in both the negligence of the
first tort-feasor remains active until the moment of impact. It is sub-
mitted that the court should have refused to insulate in the Howe case.
Where the Plaintiff Is Beyond the Zone of Immediate Danger
The reasoning of the court has also differed in cases where the
plaintiff was beyond the zone of immediate danger created by the negli-
2 For a discussion of the "but for" test see note 1 supra.
" The "but for" test is a test for actual cause, not for insulation. The court
in saying, "but for the act of McCall no collision would have occurred," has only
established that McCall's negligence was an actual cause of the collision, not that
it was such a cause that Lyons should be insulated. Indeed, it might be said that
"but for" the negligence of 'Lyons (in parking his car on the highway so that
plaintiff had to put on his brakes) no collision would have occurred. Proximate
cause is a two-pronged rule, requiring actual cause and foreseeability. For example,
in Henderson v. Powell, 221 N.C. 239, 19 S.E.2d 876 (1942), the original tort-feasor.
argued that "but for" the intervening act no injury would have occurred and that,
therefore, he should be insulated. The court rejected this, holding that there
might be several causes of an injury and that, in order for one cause to insulate
another cause, the second cause must be unforeseeable.
2" See Smith v. Grubb, 238 N.C. 665, 78 S.E2d 598 (1953), which combines the
two tests.
2 243 N.C. 668, 91 S.E.2d 894 (1956),
28 243 N.C. at 671, 91 S.E.2d at 896, quoting Hall v. Coble Dairies, Inc., 234
N.C. 206, 211, 67 S.E,2d 63, 67 (1951).
';Barber v. Wooten, 234 N.C. 107, 66 S.E.2d 690 (1951); Lewis v. Hunter




gence of the two tort-feasors. In Boone v. North Carolina R.R.,3 0
where defendant's train struck a man on the track and hurled his body
against plaintiff's intestate who was twenty-five feet away, causing her
death,31 defendant's demurrer was sustained. The court said that
actionable negligence does not exist unless the act proximately caused
the injury and that this requires foreseeability of injury. Since a de-
fendant is under no duty to foresee negligence on the part of another, 32
in the absence of notice to the contrary he may assume that the other
will exercise ordinary care for his own safety.33 Therefore, the negli-
gence of the man on the track was the sole proximate cause of the death
of plaintiff's intestate.
In an unusual case, Aldridge v. Hasty,34 defendants Burns and Hasty
were approaching one another from opposite directions on the highway
when, at a point twenty feet apart, Burns turned left in front of Hasty.
In swerving to the left to avoid the inevitable collision, Hasty's car went
across the road, jumped a ditch and an embankment, went three hun-
dred feet up into plaintiff's yard, struck the plaintiff and two cars in
plaintiff's driveway, continued on and mired down in a plowed field one
hundred feet beyond. The court, refusing to insulate Hasty, said that
as to the original collision the negligence of Burns insulated any prior
negligence of Hasty and was the sole proximate cause of the original
collision.3 5 But, it said, if Hasty was driving at such an excessive rate
of speed that he could not thereafter control his car and avoid hitting
the plaintiff, his negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's in-
jury. The court in Hasty has apparently held that plaintiff's injury
could be found to be foreseeable notwithstanding the unforeseeability
of the intervening act.3 6 If the intervening act was unforeseeable, it
would seem that there could be no foreseeable injury resulting from the
:3 240 N.C. 152, 81 S.E.2d 380 (1954).
"
1Plaintiff alleged that defendant's engineer was negligent in driving the tiain
at seventy-five to ninety miles per hour, in failing to keep a proper lookout, and in
failing to warn.
"As a general rule, the statement that one is not bound to foresee negligence
on the part of another appears to be unsound. The very fact that the first tort-
feasor in an intervening negligence situation is not always insulated weakens the
axiom. See Henderson v. Powell, 221 N.C. 239, 19 S.E.2d 876 (1942) ; Bechtler
v. Bracken, 218 N.C. 515, 11 S.E.2d 721 (1940); Gold v. Kiker, 216 N.C. 511, 5
S.E.2d 548 (1939); Harton v. Forest. City Tel. Co., 141 N.C. 455, 54 S.E. 299(1906).
"' There is room for substantial doubt that the court decided the Boone case on
the issue of insulation. The court seemed to consider the problem one of duty to
a plaintiff off the track, and it is possible that the court decided that the defendant
was not negligent as to plaintiff's intestate. However, in view of plaintiff's alle-
gation that the train was proceeding at seventy-five to ninety miles per hour with
the engineer failing to keep a proper lookout, it seems that the issue of insulation
could properly have been decided.8,240 N.C. 353, 82 S.E.2d 331 (1954).
" This is in accord with Butner v. Spease, 217 N.C. 82, 6 S.E.2d 808 (1940).
" The application of such. a principle, holding the injury foreseeable notwith-
standing the unforeseeability of the intervening act, has not been found in any
other North Carolina cases.
1959]
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act. It is submitted that the criteria of these two cases should have been
the same, i.e., one of reasonable foreseeability of the intervening act and
reasonable foreseeability of injury to the plaintiff.
Cases Consistent With Prior Authority
In other cases a degree of consistency has been reached. In Fair-
cloth v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.37 the court reaffirmed its prior holdings
that when the driver of the automobile in which plaintiff is a passenger
collides with the side of a moving train, the railroad will be insulated,
despite its negligent failure to warn.38
The court has likewise maintained a degree of consistency in cases
where the first tort-feasor has negligently failed to warn that he has, for
a proper purpose, made the highway unsafe for travel. In White v.
Dickerson, Inc.,3  where the defendant was a construction company
which failed to provide adequate warning that a bridge over a canal
was out and the driver of the automobile in which the plaintiff was a
passenger drove into the canal, the court refused to insulate the con-
struction company, the original wrongdoer, holding the intervening act
reasonably foreseeable.40 It appears that there is no justification for the
differences of reasoning which allow insulation in the stopped-car, rear-
end collision cases but refuse insulation in a case where the first tort-
feasor has failed to warn that he has made the highway unsafe for travel.
In both types of cases the negligence of the first tort-feasor has con-
tinued in active operation until the injury and was an actual cause of
the injury, and in both the injury which occurred was reasonably fore-
seeable as within the risk created.
CONCLUSION
It is thus apparent that there is confusion and inconsistency not only
within but also among the particular types of fact situations. Through-
out the entire field of insulating negligence the lack of uniformity in
reasoning or tests applied is most alarming.
It is .submitted that the court should adhere to the well recognized
test for insulation-foreseeability of the intervening act. That such a
3T247 N.C. 190, 100 S.E2d 328 (1957).
"8 Chinnis v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.., 219 N.C. 528, 14 S.E2d 500 (1941);
Herman v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 197 N.C. 718, 150 S.E. 361 (1929).89 248 N.C. 723, 105 S.E.2d 51 (1958).
,0 In Price v. City of Monroe, 234 N.C. 666, 68 S.E.2d 283 (1951), defendant
had dug a ditch across the street for the purpose of installing a new culvert; dirt
was piled up on the sides but there were no signs or warning lights. Plaintiff and
her husband, the driver, were proceeding along the street, and though plaintiff's
husband saw the dirt, he drove into the ditch. In affirming the judgment for
plaintiff the court said that the test is reasonable unforeseeability of the intervening
act, and that defendant should have foreseen the damage due to lack of warning.
See also Gold v. Kiker, 216 N.C. 511, 5 S.E.2d 548 (1939). It is hoped that this line
of reasoning will overrule that of Haney v. Town of Lincolnton, 207 N.C. 282, 176
S.E. 573 (1934), which is contra.
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practice would lessen the number of insulations is unquestionable, and
this in itself would be a laudable result in view of the fact that in every
dual negligence situation a wrongdoing defendant has actually caused
harm to an innocent plaintiff. At the same time, and probably more
important in the long run, exclusive use of the foreseeability test would
eliminate such confusion and inconsistency as that appearing in cases
since 1954.
JAMES Y. PREsToN
Trusts-United States Savings Bonds-Resulting or Constructive
Trust on Proceeds in the Hands of Surviving Co-owner
In the recent case of Tanner v. Ervin1 a husband and wife jointly
purchased United States Savings Bonds, Series E. The bonds were
issued in their names in the alternative. Subsequently they entered into
a separation and property agreement wherein for a valuable considera-
tion2 the wife transferred her interest in the bonds to her husband.
Thereafter he died with the bonds in his possession but without having
changed the registration of the bonds to his name alone.
The wife brought an action against the deceased's executor claiming
that under the treasury regulations 3 she, as the surviving co-owner of
the bonds, was the sole owner of the bonds and their proceeds. The trial
court agreed with the wife's contention that the treasury regulations
were controlling.
On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court by a four-to-three
decision reversed. The court held that while only the surviving co-
owner might cash the bonds, this did not prevent a state court from
directing the wife to do so and impressing the proceeds therefrom with
a resulting trust for the benefit of the deceased's executor.
Although the pertinent treasury regulation states in effect that upon
the death of one co-owner the surviving co-owner is alone entitled to
receive the proceeds from the government, most courts that have ruled
on the issue have felt free to reach what they considered 'the equi-
table disposition of the proceeds. The reasoning behind this, as the
court pointed out in Tanner v. Ervin, is that when the bonds are cashed,
1250 N.C. 602, 109 S.E.2d 460 (1959).
C By the property agreement the wife received two Orange Drink stores in
Charlotte and the home in which she and her husband had lived; the husband
received a 22,467.00 dollar savings account and two checking accounts totaling
24,367.45 dollars in addition to the bonds that had a present value of 17,323.00
dollars.
"If either coowner dies without the bond having been presented and surren-
dered for payment or authorized reissue, the surviving coowner will be recognized
as the sole and absolute owner of the bond and payment or reissue, as though the
bond were registered in his name alone, will be made only to such survivor." 31
C.F.R. § 315.45 (Supp. 1945) (as amended 31 C.F.R. § 315.61 (1959)). Substantially
identical provisions and regulations apply to all the bonds here under consideration.
1959]
